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INDEPENDENCE FOR WASHINGTON STATE’S
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
P. Andrew Rorholm Zellers
Abstract: Article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution prohibits special
privileges and immunities. It provides: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class
of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” Since the 1940s, the
Washington State Supreme Court has analogized article I, section 12 to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As a result, it has treated
claims under article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection Clause as a single inquiry and
applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Equal Protection analysis to article I, section 12. In the
mid-1980s, the Washington State Supreme Court began to question this practice. In 2006, the
Court divided on when and how to independently analyze article I, section 12. Justice James
Johnson would have the Court independently analyze article I, section 12 in every case;
Chief Justice Barbara Madsen would have the Court independently analyze article I, section
12 only where the law grants a privilege to a minority class; and Justice Mary Fairhurst
would have the Court independently analyze article I, section 12 only where the state
constitution provides greater protection to the right at issue than the Equal Protection Clause.
This Comment argues that the Court should abandon the approaches advanced by Chief
Justice Madsen and Justice Fairhurst and adopt Justice Johnson’s approach to interpreting
and applying article I, section 12. Justice Johnson’s approach is consistent with the clause’s
original intent, plain language, and the Court’s early decisions interpreting and applying it.
Unlike the other approaches, Justice Johnson’s approach does not put judicial efficiency,
finality, and the dignity of Washington courts and the state constitution at risk.

INTRODUCTION
Adopted in 1889, article I, section 12 of the Washington State
Constitution is the state’s privileges and immunities clause.1 It provides,
“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or
corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon
the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.”2
The Washington State Supreme Court has considered article I, section
12 to be substantially equivalent to the Equal Protection Clause because
both provisions require that laws apply equally to all.3 Due to this
common treatment, the Court stopped independently analyzing claims
1. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 80, 59 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1936), overruled
on other grounds by Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. Moos, 92 Wash. 2d 939, 603 P.2d 819 (1979).
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under article I, section 12 during the 1940s. Instead, the Court addressed
claims under both article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection Clause as
a single issue, resolving both using the tiered scrutiny the U.S. Supreme
Court applies to the Equal Protection Clause.4
In 1986, the Court’s approach to the state constitution (and to article I,
section 12) changed with its adoption of the so-called Gunwall criteria.5
The Gunwall criteria guide the Court’s determination of when and how
to analyze a state constitutional provision independent of an analogous
federal provision.6 In 2002, the Court applied the Gunwall criteria to
determine that article I, section 12 warranted an analysis independent of
the Equal Protection Clause.7
Several years later, the Court divided three ways on when and how to
independently analyze article I, section 12.8 Justice Johnson9 rejected the
assertion that article I, section 12 is analogous to the Equal Protection
Clause and did not rely on the Gunwall criteria to determine when and
how to independently analyze article I, section 12.10 Under his approach
the Court would independently analyze article I, section 12 in every case
according to its plain language.11 In contrast to Justice Johnson’s
approach, Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Fairhurst start with the
presumption that article I, section 12 is analogous to the Equal
Protection Clause and rely on the Gunwall criteria to determine when
and how to independently analyze article I, section 12 in appropriate
cases.12 Under Chief Justice Madsen’s approach, the Court would
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986); see, e.g., State v. Smith,
117 Wash. 2d 263, 284, 814 P.2d 652, 662 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring).
6. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.
7. Grant Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake (Grant County I), 145 Wash. 2d 702,
725–31, 42 P.3d 394, 405–08 (2002), vacated in part, Grant Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of
Moses Lake (Grant County II), 150 Wash. 2d 791, 83 P.3d 419 (2004).
8. Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 92–98, 111–20, 127–28, 163 P.3d 757, 763–66, 773–77,
781–82 (2007); Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 13–19, 58–64, 120–28, 138 P.3d 963,
971–73, 993–96, 1040–43 (2006).
9. In this Comment, all references to Justice Johnson are to Justice James M. Johnson unless
otherwise noted. Justice Charles Johnson also serves on the Washington State Supreme Court.
10. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 62, 138 P.3d at 995 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring) (“[T]he most
apt analogy from the United States Constitution is its privileges and immunities clause, not the
equal protection clause.”).
11. Id. at 58–59, 138 P.3d at 993; Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 119, 163 P.3d at 777 (J.M. Johnson,
J., concurring).
12. See Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 163 P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring) (relying on
Grant County II for the proposition that article I, section 12 requires an analysis independent of the
Equal Protection Clause); id. at 93, 163 P.3d at 764 (plurality opinion); Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at
14, 138 P.3d at 971.
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independently analyze article I, section 12 “only where the challenged
legislation grants a privilege or immunity to a minority class.”13 “In
other cases,” the Court would apply “the same analysis that applies
under the federal [Equal Protection Clause].”14 Under Justice Fairhurst’s
approach, the Court would independently analyze article I, section 12
only where the state constitution provides greater protection to the right
at issue than the Equal Protection Clause.15
Whether the Washington State Supreme Court adopts the approach of
Chief Justice Madsen, or another justice, directly affects how the Court
decides claims under article I, section 12. For example, under Chief
Justice Madsen’s approach, a party claiming that a law grants a privilege
or immunity to an individual citizen in violation of article I, section 12
and the Equal Protection Clause would not receive an independent state
constitutional analysis because the law does not implicate a minority
class.16 The Court’s approach also matters because each approach is
arguably more, or less, coherent in light of article I, section 12’s plain
language, original intent, and the Court’s early decisions interpreting the
clause.
The Washington State Supreme Court should adopt Justice Johnson’s
approach to article I, section 12. Unlike the other two approaches,
Justice Johnson’s approach is consistent with article I, section 12’s plain
language, original intent, and the Court’s early decisions interpreting
article I, section 12. Unlike the other two approaches, it does not pose
threats to judicial efficiency, finality, and the independence and dignity
of Washington courts and the state constitution. Part I of this Comment
details the enactment of article I, section 12, and Part II describes how
the Court has relied on the federal Constitution to interpret and analyze
the provision. Part III explains the Gunwall criteria and their effect on
article I, section 12 jurisprudence. Part IV shows how the Court applied
the Gunwall criteria to article I, section 12 to determine that it warrants
an analysis independent of the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, Part V
explains the Court’s divided approaches to article I, section 12, and Part
VI argues in favor of Justice Johnson’s approach in preference to Chief
Justice Madsen’s and Justice Fairhurst’s.
13. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 163 P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring); Andersen, 158
Wash. 2d at 14, 138 P.3d at 971 (emphasis added).
14. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 16, 138 P.3d at 972; see also Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 163
P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring).
15. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 93–95, 163 P.3d at 764–65.
16. Cf. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 163 P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring); Andersen, 158
Wash. 2d at 14, 16, 138 P.3d at 971–72.
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ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 IS MODELED ON OREGON’S
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, NOT AN
ANALOGOUS FEDERAL PROVISION

In 1889, Congress passed the Enabling Act, which invited the people
of the Dakotas, Montana, and Washington to form constitutions, erect
state governments, and join the Union.17 That year, Washington
Territory held the Washington Constitutional Convention.18 Historical
evidence demonstrates that the delegates to the Convention borrowed
heavily from other state constitutions.19 Specifically, the evidence
indicates that the drafters of article I, section 12 relied on Oregon’s
privileges and immunities clause and not on either of the federal
privileges and immunities clauses or the Equal Protection Clause.20
A.

The Delegates Borrowed Heavily from Other State Constitutions to
Draft Article I of the Washington State Constitution

To draft the Washington State Constitution, the delegates referred to
other state constitutions, the federal Constitution, and a proposed
constitution by W. Lair Hill—a noted lawyer in California and Oregon.
Hill’s proposal borrowed heavily from Oregon’s constitution and was
printed widely and distributed at the state convention.21 As a result,
article I of the state constitution, its Declaration of Rights, consists
almost entirely of provisions that are identical or substantially similar to
those in the Indiana, Oregon, and U.S. constitutions, and to Hill’s
proposed constitution.22 Because the provisions mirror those in other
state constitutions and the federal Constitution in letter or spirit,23 one
may conclude that the delegates knowingly adopted a given provision to
the exclusion of others.24 Of the thirty-two provisions in article I,
17. Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676.
18. Lebbeus J. Knapp, The Origin of the Constitution of the State of Washington, 4 WASH. HIST.
Q. 227, 227 (1913).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. ARTHUR S. BEARDSLEY, NOTES ON THE SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON, 1889–1939, at 1–5 (1939); Charles M. Gates, Foreword to THE JOURNAL OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, at v (Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962)
[hereinafter JOURNAL].
22. BEARDSLEY, supra note 21.
23. Id.; JOURNAL, supra note 21.
24. See State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 285, 814 P.2d 652, 662 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring)
(noting the difference in language between article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection Clause
“suggests the drafters meant something different from the federal provision”).
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twenty-five are textually identical or substantially similar to Oregon
provisions.25 By contrast, only twelve provisions bear similarities to
federal provisions.26 And of those twelve, ten resemble Oregon
provisions as well, leaving only two provisions in article I of
Washington’s constitution with distinctly federal origins.27 The
comparison illustrates the Oregon constitution’s imprint on the
delegates’ work, and suggests that Oregon state constitutional law has
greater persuasive authority over Washington State constitutional law
than federal constitutional law.28
B.

The Delegates Appropriated Oregon’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause and Extended It to Address Contemporary Concerns

Like much of article I of the Washington State Constitution, the
delegates borrowed from the Oregon State Constitution to craft article I,
section 12. On July 11, 1889, Allen Weir, the Convention’s temporary
secretary, submitted to the Bill of Rights Committee a privileges and
immunities provision identical to Oregon’s.29 It read: “No law shall be
passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens any privileges or
immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens.”30 Two weeks later, the Committee put an edited version of
Weir’s proposed clause up for the delegates’ vote.31 The clause, which

25. BEARDSLEY, supra note 21.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Cf. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d at 287, 814 P.2d at 663–64 (Utter, J., concurring) (treating Oregon
precedent as persuasive authority for independently analyzing article I, section 12 because the
clause is modeled after Oregon’s); see also Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d 791, 807–08 & 807 n.11,
83 P.3d 419, 426 & n.11 (2004) (looking to Oregon precedent to interpret article I, section 12).
29. JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 489, 501. Compare id. at 501, with OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. John
P. Hoyt, the Convention’s president, was a former Michigan legislator and a Washington Territory
Supreme Court judge from 1878 to 1887. He also served on the Washington State Supreme Court
from 1889 to 1897. JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 465. As Convention president, Hoyt appointed
standing committees for each article of the constitution. RULES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON 2 (Thos. H. Cavanaugh, 1889). To the sevenmember Bill of Rights Committee, Hoyt appointed four former members of the Territorial
Legislature, two of whom were also lawyers. Id. at 8. C.H. Warner was a former lawyer, law
professor, and member of the Territorial Legislature. JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 488. George
Comegys was a lawyer, member of the Territorial Legislature, and Speaker of the House. Id. at 469.
Francis Henry served three terms in the Territorial Legislature and was a clerk to the Territorial
Supreme Court. Id. at 475. J.C. Kellogg was a former member of the Territorial Legislature. Id. at
477.
30. JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 501.
31. See id. at 500–01.
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remains unchanged, reads: “SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES PROHIBITED. No law shall be passed granting to any
citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges
or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens, or corporations.”32 The final version is identical to Oregon’s
privileges and immunities clause, except that the delegates extended its
scope to apply to corporations as well as individual citizens and classes
of citizens.33 Thus, article I, section 12 provides broader protection for
privileges and immunities than Oregon’s provision.
The delegates extended article I, section 12 to corporations to address
contemporary concerns with governmental abuse and corporate
influence, which had both run rampant under the Territorial
Legislature.34 In the mid-1800s, the Territorial Legislature was known
for granting special acts or privileges to the benefit of monopolies.35 For
instance, in the 1862–63 session, the legislature passed 150 private acts,
which were mostly monopolies for “roads, bridges, trails, ferries, and the
like.”36 The Washington Standard asserted that the legislature had
“inaugurated a perfect system of logrolling for private interests against
the general welfare.”37 The extension of article I, section 12 to
corporations was a counter to governmental abuse and corporate
influence, making more suspect laws subject to judicial review.
In sum, the delegates to the Washington State Constitutional
Convention relied predominantly on other state constitutions to draft the
Washington State Constitution. Specifically, the Oregon State
Constitution appears to have had the greatest influence on the drafting of
Article I of the Washington State Constitution. Records from the
convention show that the delegates started with a privileges and
immunities clause identical to Oregon’s, and then extended it to apply to
corporations in addition to natural persons. The decision to prohibit the
State from granting privileges and immunities to corporations addressed
contemporary concerns with governmental abuse and corporate
influence. The delegates’ decision to model article I, section 12 on
Oregon’s privileges and immunities clause rather than a similar federal
32. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
33. JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 500–01.
34. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 26–27 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 2002).
35. Wilfred J. Airey, A History of the Constitution and Government of Washington Territory 208
(1945) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington) (on file with Gallagher Law Library).
36. Id. at 210.
37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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provision such as the Equal Protection Clause is important because it
suggests they intended something different than Equal Protection.38
II.

HISTORICALLY, THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME
COURT HAS ANALOGIZED ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 TO
THE FEDERAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES

While the Oregon State Constitution influenced the creation of article
I, section 12, the U.S. Constitution has influenced the Washington State
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the clause. The U.S. Constitution’s
influence on article I, section 12 is complex because the Court has relied
on two different federal provisions to interpret it: the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. To define and interpret the term “privileges and
immunities,” the Washington State Supreme Court looks to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the same term in Article IV. Yet, to
review claims under article I, section 12, the Court has often applied the
tiered scrutiny the U.S. Supreme Court applies to Equal Protection
claims.39
A.

The Washington State Supreme Court Interprets the Term
“Privileges and Immunities” the Same as the U.S. Supreme Court
Interprets the Term in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution

The Washington State Supreme Court defines the term “privileges
and immunities” as “pertain[ing] alone to those fundamental rights

38. See State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 285, 814 P.2d 652, 662 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring).
39. The Equal Protection Clause provides that “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. When reviewing
challenges to class-based legislation under the Clause, courts ask whether the government’s purpose
justifies the challenged classification. See, e.g., Railway Exp. Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
109 (1949). Whether the government’s justification is sufficient depends on the discrimination at
issue. In general, strict scrutiny applies to distinctions based on national citizenship, race, or
national origin. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986). Under
strict scrutiny, courts uphold the law if it is proved necessary to meet a compelling government
interest. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984). Intermediate scrutiny applies to
distinctions based on gender and legitimacy. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Under intermediate scrutiny, courts uphold the law if it is
proved substantially related to an important government purpose. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197. Rational
basis review applies to all other laws challenged under the Clause. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,
331–32 (1981). Under rational basis review, courts uphold the law if it is proved rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988).

17 - WLR March 2012 Zellers Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

338

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/15/2012 12:08 PM

[Vol. 87:331

which belong to the citizens of the state by reason of such citizenship.”40
More specifically, to define and interpret the “privileges and
immunities” of Washington State citizenship, the Court has held that
state courts should look to Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. In the
1902 case State v. Vance,41 the Court reviewed a claim that a state law
giving county bar associations the exclusive power to nominate
candidates to serve as jury commissioners granted special privileges.42
Rejecting this claim, the Court held that the “right simply of
recommendation . . . is not, in its very nature, such a fundamental right
of a citizen that it may be said to come within the prohibition of the
constitution, or to have been had in mind by the framers of that organic
law.”43 The Court explained that federal privileges and immunities
“secure in each state to the citizens of all states” the right to conduct
business, to possess property, to remedy for debt collection, to enforce
personal rights, and to exemption from taxes as others are in other
states.44 The Court held, “By analogy these words as used in the state
constitution should receive like definition and interpretation as that
applied to them when interpreting the federal constitution.”45
The U.S. Constitution contains two clauses related to privileges and
immunities: the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Vance, the Washington State Supreme Court referred to the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, not the Fourteenth Amendment.46
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV prohibits a state
from discriminating against out-of-state citizens.47 But, discrimination
does not run afoul of the Clause if there is a “substantial reason” for the
discrimination, and that reason is substantially related to a state

40. State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458, 70 P. 34, 41 (1902).
41. 29 Wash. 435, 70 P. 34.
42. Id. at 454–55, 70 P. at 40.
43. Id. at 458–59, 70 P. at 41.
44. Id. at 458, 70 P. at 41.
45. Id.
46. In Vance, the Washington State Supreme Court referred to the federal privileges and
immunities that “secure in each state to the citizens of all states.” Vance, 29 Wash. at 458, 70 P. at
41. Thus, it explicitly referred to the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution, which reads, “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States,” and not the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”).
47. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).
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objective.48 The Clause does not make the privileges and immunities
under one state constitution the privileges and immunities under another
state constitution.49 In Austin v. New Hampshire,50 Justice Thurgood
Marshall explained that the “Clause thus establishes a norm of comity
without specifying the particular subjects as to which citizens of one
State coming within the jurisdiction of another are guaranteed equality
of treatment.”51
Federal case law suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court interprets
“privileges and immunities” to include constitutional rights as well as
rights or actions related to livelihood.52 For example, the Court held that
the Clause prohibits states from burdening out-of-state citizens’ access
to state courts, their power to buy and sell property,53 and even their
ability to obtain abortions within the state.54 The Court has also held that
the Clause prohibits states from burdening out-of-staters’ right to
practice a profession, obtain licenses, and gain employment, but not their
right to sport or recreation.55
Case law suggests that the Washington State Supreme Court
interprets the privileges and immunities of article I, section 12
consistently with the U. S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of privileges
and immunities under the federal Constitution. For example, the
Washington State Supreme Court has held that the state’s privileges and
immunities include the right to practice a profession in a particular
48. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985). To determine whether the
discrimination is related to the state’s objective, the Court employs the least restrictive alternative
analysis. Id.
49. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180–81 (1869) (“Special privileges enjoyed by
citizens in their own States are not secured in other States by this provision. It was not intended by
the provision to give to the laws of one State any operation in other States.”); see also Hague, 307
U.S. at 511.
50. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
51. Id. at 660.
52. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.5.2 (3d ed.
2006).
53. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (citing Canadian N.
Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920) and Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898)).
54. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973) (holding that a state may not restrict out-of-state
citizens’ ability to obtain in-state abortions).
55. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (invalidating law that required
state residency to practice law); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533–34 (1978) (invalidating law
that gave state residents job preference over out-of-state citizens on natural resource development
projects); Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388 (upholding a Montana State law that charged higher rates to outof-staters for hunting licenses because “hunting by nonresidents in Montana is a recreation and a
sport” and is not fundamental under the Clause); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 420 (1952)
(invalidating law that charged out-of-state citizens more for a licensing fee).
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place,56 to make deductions from taxes,57 to sell goods,58 and to obtain
business licenses.59 The Court has rejected rights that are unrelated to a
person’s livelihood, such as the right to recommend someone for public
appointment60 and the right to smoke in a private facility.61 The Court
has suggested that state privileges and immunities include those rights
secured in the state constitution, such as the right to petition the
government, to vote, and to a speedy trial.62 Thus, consistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the privileges and immunities of
Article IV, the Washington State Supreme Court interprets the privileges
and immunities of article I, section 12 to include state constitutional
rights and rights related to livelihood.
B.

The Washington State Supreme Court Has Applied the Standard of
Review of the Equal Protection Clause to Article I, Section 12

Originally, the Washington State Supreme Court reviewed claims
under article I, section 12 without reference or resort to the Equal
56. See Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Fishback, 130 Wash. 490, 494–96, 228 P. 516, 517–18 (1924)
(holding that law permitting only one agent per insurance company in a city of fifty thousand or less
or two agents in any city of greater population violated article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection
Clause).
57. See Nathan v. Spokane County, 35 Wash. 26, 36, 76 P. 521, 524 (1904) (holding that law
allowing a person who had paid certain property taxes to deduct the amount paid from the next
assessment violated article I, section 12 because it “discriminate[d] between taxpayers of the same
class” and granted a privilege or immunity to certain taxpayers).
58. See Ex parte Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 397–98, 80 P. 547, 549 (1905) (holding that a law
prohibiting retailers from selling goods in a district but exempting producers of goods violated
article 1, section 12 because it granted a special privilege); see also State v. Robinson Co., 84 Wash.
246, 250, 146 P. 628, 629 (1915) (holding that law regulating sales of feed stuffs, and excepting
flour mills, violated article I, section 12 because it granted a privilege to cereal and flour mills).
59. See City of Seattle v. Dencker, 58 Wash. 501, 510–11, 108 P. 1086, 1090 (1910) (holding that
law requiring a license to possess or control automatic vending machines, except for machines
automating the sale of gas, telephone use, and candies, violated article I, section 12); see also City
of Seattle v. Gibson, 96 Wash. 425, 432–33, 165 P. 109, 112 (1917) (finding that law authorizing a
council to decide who among pharmacists should receive licenses to practice as druggists violated
article I, section 12 because it involved granting a privilege unequally and provided for an arbitrary
determination).
60. State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458–59, 70 P. 34, 41 (1902).
61. Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 164 Wash. 2d 570, 600–01, 192
P.3d 306, 322 (2008).
62. See Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 95, 120, 163 P.3d 757, 765, 777 (2007) (holding that
the right to vote is a privilege); Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d 791, 815–16, 83 P.3d 419, 429–30
(2004) (distinguishing the right to annexation from the right to petition under article I, section 4 and
the right to vote under article I, section 19 to conclude that the right to annexation is not a privilege
or immunity); State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 291, 814 P.2d 652, 666 (1991) (Utter, J.,
concurring) (treating the right to a speedy trial as a privilege).
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Protection Clause.63 In the 1892 case of State v. Carey,64 the earliest case
to interpret article I, section 12, the Washington State Supreme Court
determined whether a law, which authorized the governor to appoint the
members of the state medical examination board, violated article I,
section 12 of the state constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, or the Equal Protection Clause.65 The Court analyzed
article I, section 12 independently and held the law did not violate any of
these provisions.66 Indeed, the Court independently analyzed article I,
section 12 into the 1950s.67 The Court’s original practice, established
63. See, e.g., State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 426–30, 30 P. 729, 729–31 (1892) (applying separate
state and federal analyses and holding that a law requiring medical practitioners to be licensed by
state examining board did not violate article I, section 12, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, or the Equal Protection Clause).
64. 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729.
65. Id. at 426–27, 30 P. at 729–30.
66. Id. at 426–30, 30 P. at 729–31. Three of the four justices who presided over the State v. Carey
case were delegates to the state constitutional convention. Justice Ralph O. Dunbar, the author of
the majority opinion in Carey, was a member of the Territorial Legislature from 1878 to 1887, a
delegate to the convention, and a state Supreme Court justice from 1889 to 1912. JOURNAL, supra
note 21, at 470; Justice Ralph O. Dunbar, TEMPLE JUST., http://templeofjustice.org/justice/ralph-odunbar/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). Justice Theodore L. Stiles, who joined Justice Dunbar’s opinion
in Carey, was a delegate and a state Supreme Court justice from 1889 to 1895. JOURNAL, supra at
485; Justice John P. Hoyt, TEMPLE JUST., http://templeofjustice.org/justice/theodore-l-stiles/ (last
visited Feb. 21, 2012). Justice John P. Hoyt, who dissented in Carey, was a Washington Territory
Supreme Court judge from 1878 to 1887, president of the convention, and a state Supreme Court
justice from 1889 to 1897. JOURNAL, supra at 486; Justice John P. Hoyt, TEMPLE JUST.,
http://templeofjustice.org/justice/john-p-hoyt/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
67. See, e.g., Larson v. City of Shelton, 37 Wash. 2d 481, 490, 224 P.2d 1067, 1072 (1950)
(holding that a law requiring a license to peddle goods, but exempting veterans from paying the fee,
violated article I, section 12); City of Seattle v. Rogers, 6 Wash. 2d 31, 36–38, 106 P.2d 598, 600–
01 (1940) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting certain charity campaigns without a license, but
exempting the Seattle Community Fund, violated article I, section 12); Pearson v. City of Seattle,
199 Wash. 217, 227, 90 P.2d 1020, 1024 (1939) (holding that a tax on solid fuel dealers, which
exempted liquid fuel dealers, violated article I, section 12); State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash.
75, 84, 59 P.2d 1101, 1105 (1936) (holding that a law prohibiting issuance of licenses for gill nets
except for those holding licenses from 1932 to 1933 violated article I, section 12), overruled on
other grounds by Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. Moos, 92 Wash. 2d 939, 603 P.2d 819 (1979);
Sherman Clay & Co. v. Brown, 131 Wash. 679, 690, 231 P. 166, 170 (1924) (holding that a city
ordinance prohibiting second-hand dealers from disposing of goods for ten days after receipt, but
exempting purchasers of stoves, furniture, etc., violated article I, section 12); State v. Robinson Co.,
84 Wash. 246, 250, 146 P. 628, 629 (1915) (holding that a state law that exempted cereal and flour
mills from requirements placed on other companies selling the same goods violated article I, section
12); City of Seattle v. Dencker, 58 Wash. 501, 510–11, 108 P. 1086, 1090 (1910) (holding that an
ordinance imposing a tax on the sale of certain goods by machine but not on merchants selling the
same goods violated article I, section 12); City of Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 325–26, 98 P.
755, 756 (1909) (holding that an ordinance regulating employment agencies was unconstitutional
because it imposed criminal penalties on such agencies engaging in false pretenses but not on other
companies engaging in similar conduct); Ex parte Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 397–98, 80 P. 547, 549
(1905) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting anyone from peddling fruits and vegetables within
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just three years after statehood, suggests the delegates intended the Court
to independently analyze article I, section 12.68
Despite this original independent approach, the Court has analogized
article I, section 12 to the Equal Protection Clause. From the 1940s until
early 2000, the Court has regularly applied the standard of review
applicable under the Clause to article I, section 12. In the 1920s, Chief
Justice Emmett M. Parker began to analogize article I, section 12 to the
Equal Protection Clause. In State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court for
Pierce County,69 then-Justice Parker stated that any state law that
authorized an officer to issue or withhold licenses to engage in a legal
enterprise without limits on his or her discretion violated the Equal
Protection Clause.70 In article I, section 12, then-Justice Parker
remarked, “we find the same guaranty, in substance.”71 In State v.
Hart,72 Chief Justice Parker held that an excise tax on wholesale, but not
retail, sales of liquefied fuels did not violate article I, section 12 or the
Equal Protection Clause.73 Chief Justice Parker explained that the Court
declined to discuss separately the appellants’ claims under the federal
and state constitutions because “the reason and the result to be reached
would necessarily be the same, in view of the manifest identity in
substance of the rights guaranteed by the . . . provisions.”74 In Hart,
Chief Justice Parker did not explain why he thought article I, section 12
and the Equal Protection Clause are substantively the same. The opinion
suggests that he believed the provisions guaranteed the same rights. To
the extent that this is the case, Chief Justice Parker’s position was
inconsistent with the fact that the Equal Protection Clause protects any
right, while article I, section 12 protects only a privilege or immunity.75
In State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse,76 the Court both distinguished and
equated article I, section 12 with the Equal Protection Clause. In Bacich,
the Court held that a law, which limited licenses to fish with gill nets in
city limits, but exempting farmers, violated article I, section 12).
68. See Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 113, 163 P.3d 757, 774 (2007) (Madsen, J.,
concurring) (invoking the “precept that an interpretation of the state constitution made closest to
[its] adoption . . . provides the best evidence of the drafters’ intent”).
69. 113 Wash. 296, 193 P. 845 (1920).
70. Id. at 302, 193 P. 845, 847.
71. Id.
72. 125 Wash. 520, 217 P. 45 (1923).
73. Id. at 524–25, 217 P. at 46–47.
74. Id. at 525–26, 217 P. at 47.
75. Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 124, 138 P.3d 963, 1042 (2006) (Chambers, J.,
concurring in dissent).
76. 187 Wash. 75, 59 P.2d 1101 (1936).
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coastal waters to those persons and corporations who held them between
1932 and 1933, violated article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection
Clause.77 The Court stated that the “aim and purpose of [article I, section
12] and of the [Equal Protection Clause] is to secure equality of
treatment of all persons, without undue favor on the one hand or hostile
discrimination on the other.” 78 In other words, the Court recognized that
while both provisions seek equal treatment under the law, article I,
section 12’s purpose is to prevent unequal treatment related to undue
favoritism whereas the Equal Protection Clause’s purpose is to prevent
unequal treatment related to hostile discrimination.79 Because of their
similarity, the Court held that class-based legislation satisfied both
provisions if it met two requirements.80 First, “[t]he legislation must
apply alike to all persons within the designated class; and [second,]
reasonable ground must exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within the class and those who do not.”81 In light of this twopart test, it is noteworthy that the Bacich Court did independently
analyze article I, section 12,82 though the outcome was the same under
both provisions.83
Yet, following Bacich, the Court regularly treated claims under both
article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection Clause as a single issue.84
77. Id. at 84, 59 P.2d at 1105, overruled on other grounds by Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v.
Moos, 92 Wash. 2d 939, 603 P.2d 819 (1979).
78. Bacich, 187 Wash. at 80, 59 P.2d at 1104 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 82, 59 P.2d at 1104–05 (noting that the state holds fish in trust for all people, not for a
few persons or a minority, and that the act implicated a privilege).
83. Id. (finding that the law applied alike to all license holders, but holding that the distinction
between license holders in 1932 and 1933 and those in other years did not rest on reasonable
grounds).
84. See, e.g., Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 640, 771 P.2d 711, 714 (1989)
(stating that the Court has applied the “federal tiered scrutiny model of equal protection analysis” to
claims under article I, section 12); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201, 209 (1978)
(“It is the well-established rule of law in this state that a statutory classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend the equal protection clause or the privileges and immunities
clause.” (quoting Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Govan Inv. Trust, 78 Wash. 2d 584, 588, 478 P.2d
232, 235 (1970)); Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 588, 589, 528 P.2d 474, 476
(1974) (referring to the “equal protection clause found in [article I, section 12]”); Markham Adver.
Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 427, 439 P.2d 248, 261 (1968) (stating that article I, section 12 and
the Equal Protection Clause have “the same import, and [that the Court] appl[ies] them as one”);
Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wash. 2d 425, 435, 353 P.2d 941, 947 (1960) (stating that the Equal Protection
Clause and article I, section 12 “require that class legislation must apply alike to all persons within a
class, and reasonable ground must exist for making a distinction between those within, and those
without, a designated class”).
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In doing so, the Court generally adhered to the two-pronged approach
outlined in Bacich. To determine whether a distinction between classes
was reasonable, the Court applied minimum, intermediate, or strict
scrutiny,85 as the U.S. Supreme Court does under the Equal Protection
Clause.86 The Washington State Supreme Court’s approach is
inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to the Privileges
and Immunities of Article IV, where the Court applies intermediate
scrutiny in every case.87 The Washington State Supreme Court has never
explained why it looks to Article IV to clarify article I, section 12, but
the Fourteenth Amendment to review claims under it.88
III. IN STATE v. SMITH, JUSTICE UTTER USED THE GUNWALL
CRITERIA TO DETERMINE THAT THE COURT SHOULD
INDEPENDENTLY ANALYZE ARTICLE I, SECTION 12
In the mid-1980s, the Washington State Supreme Court devised the
Gunwall criteria to determine when and how the Court should consider
the state constitution to extend broader rights than the U.S.
Constitution.89 In a concurring opinion in State v. Smith,90 Justice Robert
Utter used the Gunwall criteria to argue that the Court should
independently analyze article I, section 12.91 Justice Utter’s Smith
85. See, e.g., Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 640, 771 P.2d at 714 (noting that the Court has applied the
“federal tiered scrutiny model of equal protection analysis” to claims under article I, section 12);
Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 201–02, 517 P.2d 599, 603 (1973) (holding that a law making
pregnant women ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits violated article I, section 12 and
the Equal Protection Clause because it did not pass strict scrutiny).
86. See supra note 39.
87. To determine whether a challenged law violates the Clause, courts engage in a two-step
inquiry. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984).
First, the court asks whether the challenged state law discriminates against out-of-staters with
respect to a privilege or immunity. Id. Second, the court asks whether the discriminatory law is
sufficiently justified. Id. at 222. The law is sufficiently justified “where (i) there is a substantial
reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents
bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.” Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274, 284 (1985). “In deciding whether the discrimination bears a close or substantial relationship to
the State’s objective, the Court has considered the availability of less restrictive means.” Id.
Professor Chemerinsky notes, “Thus far, the Court has not found that any law meets this rigorous
test.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, § 5.5.3.
88. But see Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d 791, 805 n.10, 83 P.3d 419, 425 n.10 (2004)
(reasoning that the Court has always compared article I, section 12 to the Equal Protection Clause
because “federal jurisprudence has focused on the [Clause] in cases involving differential
treatment”).
89. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986).
90. 117 Wash. 2d 263, 814 P.2d 652 (1991).
91. Id. at 284–85, 814 P.2d at 662 (Utter, J., concurring).
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concurrence is the first post-Gunwall opinion to argue for a return to an
independent analysis under article I, section 12.
A.

In 1986, the Washington State Supreme Court Adopted the
Gunwall Criteria to Determine When and How to Independently
Analyze the State Constitution

During the mid-twentieth century, state courts across the country
made state constitutional provisions dependent on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of parallel provisions in the federal Constitution.92
In mid-1970s, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan observed
that increasingly state courts were “construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens
of their states even more protection than the federal provisions, even
those identically phrased.”93 As state courts increasingly adopted
independent interpretations of state constitutional provisions, they faced
the practical concern of how to do so.94 “[S]tate judges [and] the lawyers
who appear before them,” Oregon State Supreme Court Justice Hans
Linde wrote, “face[d] problems of sources and methods to which they
had given little thought.”95
In the mid-1980s, the Washington State Supreme Court addressed the
issue in State v. Gunwall.96 In Gunwall, the Court adopted six nonexclusive criteria to determine “whether, in a given situation, the
Washington State Constitution should be considered as extending
broader rights to its citizens than the United States Constitution.”97 The
six Gunwall criteria are: (1) textual language of the state constitution; (2)
textual differences between parallel provisions of the state and federal
constitutions; (3) state constitutional and common law history; (4)
preexisting state law; (5) structural differences between the state and
federal constitutions; and (6) state or local concerns.98 Since Gunwall,
92. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165,
166 (1984) (“State courts are returning to their state charters to deal with issues that for forty years
they left to be debated and resolved by the national Supreme Court.”).
93. William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 495 (1977). For Justice Brennan, “[t]his pattern of state court decisions puts to rest the
notion that state constitutional provisions were adopted to mirror the federal Bill of Rights.” Id. at
501.
94. See Linde, supra note 92, at 166 (“The question in the state courts no longer is whether to
give independent attention to state constitutional issues, but how.”).
95. Id.
96. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
97. Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.
98. See id.
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the Court has framed its decision whether to independently analyze
article I, section 12 in terms of these criteria.
B.

In His Concurrence in State v. Smith, Justice Utter Argued That
the Court Should Interpret Article I, Section 12 Independently of
the Equal Protection Clause

In State v. Smith, the Washington State Supreme Court examined
whether a state law that created the right to move for revision of a
juvenile court commissioner ruling—a right not enjoyed by juveniles
appearing before a judge—violated article I, section 12 or the Equal
Protection Clause.99 Writing for the majority, Justice Andersen noted
that article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection Clause require that
similarly situated persons receive equal treatment under the law.100
Justice Andersen rejected the appellant’s request that the Court apply the
Gunwall criteria to article I, section 12 and hold that the provision
prohibits disparate treatment of juveniles in the context of judicial
review.101 Justice Andersen explained that the Court had recently held
that article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection Clause “are
substantially identical and considered by [the Court] as one issue.”102
Instead, Justice Andersen determined that rational basis review was
warranted under the Equal Protection Clause, and ultimately held there
was no violation of “equal protection under either the state or federal
constitution.”103
In a concurring opinion, Justice Utter noted that recent cases
suggested that differences between article I, section 12 and the Equal
Protection Clause “might require a different interpretation,”104 and
argued that to ignore the provisions’ different histories and language “is
to rewrite our constitution without [the] benefit of a constitutional
99. State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 268, 814 P.2d 652, 654 (1991).
100. Id. at 276–77, 814 P.2d at 658.
101. Id. at 281, 814 P.2d at 660–61. Justice Andersen authored the Gunwall opinion. Gunwall,
106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808.
102. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d at 281, 814 P.2d at 660.
103. Id. at 279, 281, 814 P.2d at 659, 661.
104. Id. at 282, 814 P.2d at 661 (Utter, J., concurring) (citing In re Mota, 114 Wash. 2d 465, 472,
788 P.2d 538, 541–42 (1990) and Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711
(1989)). Later in his concurrence, Justice Utter noted that in Sofie, the Court stated, “We have
followed this approach because a separate analysis focusing on the language and history of our state
constitution has not been urged.” Id. at 284, 814 P.2d at 662 (quotation marks omitted). He also
noted that in Darrin v. Gould, the Court stated that article I, section 12 “may be construed to
provide greater protection to individual rights than that provided by the [Equal Protection Clause].”
Id. (quoting Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 868, 540 P.2d 882, 887–88 (1975)).
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convention and to deprive the people of this state of additional rights.”105
Justice Utter noted that the original purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause was to prevent states from denying rights that had been bestowed
on other classes whereas the purpose of article I, section 12 was to
prevent the State from acting out of favoritism.106 He further argued that
“[t]he fact that [article I, section 12] was modeled after another state’s
provision, and not the federal one, indicates it was meant to be
interpreted independently.”107
After outlining his disagreement with the majority opinion’s portrayal
of recent article I, section 12 precedent, Justice Utter applied the
Gunwall criteria to reason and concluded that an independent analysis
under article I, section 12 was warranted in the case.108 In particular,
Justice Utter’s Gunwall analysis found that rules of statutory and
constitutional interpretation require that the Court give meaning to the
provisions’ significant differences in language.109 Also, state
constitutional history directs the Court not to the Equal Protection
Clause, but to Oregon’s privileges and immunities clause, which the
Oregon State Supreme Court considers antithetical to the Equal
Protection Clause and interprets independently.110
Justice Utter relied upon the Oregon State Supreme Court’s
independent approach to privileges and immunities in State v. Clark111 to
analyze the defendant’s claim under article I, section 12 rather than the
Equal Protection Clause.112 Although Smith involved a privilege—the
right to a speedy trial—Justice Utter concluded that the different
treatment of juveniles appearing before juvenile court commissioners
and superior court judges was constitutionally permissible, especially
where all juveniles in the same forum are treated equally.113 Thus,

105. Id. at 282, 814 P.2d at 661.
106. Id. at 283, 814 P.2d at 661–62.
107. Id. at 283, 814 P.2d at 662.
108. Id. at 284–87, 814 P.2d at 662–63.
109. Id. at 285, 814 P.2d at 662 (“In Gunwall, we held the difference in language between [article
I, section 7] and [the Fourth Amendment] ‘is material and allows us to render a more expansive
interpretation’ to the state provision.”) (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 65, 720 P.2d
808, 814 (1986)) .
110. Id. at 285–86, 814 P.2d at 663. Justice Utter also noted that the “treatment of juveniles in
criminal matters” is a matter of state and local concern (the sixth Gunwall criterion). Id. at 286–87,
814 P.2d at 663.
111. State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810 (Or. 1981).
112. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d at 287–90, 814 P.2d at 664–65 (Clark, 630 P.2d 810).
113. Id. at 291, 814 P.2d at 666.
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Justice Utter found that the law did not violate article I, section 12.114
In Smith, Justice Utter ultimately reached the same conclusion as the
majority.115 But Justice Utter’s analysis of article I, section 12 differed
and his Gunwall analysis laid the groundwork for future arguments over
article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection Clause.116 For
approximately sixteen years after Gunwall, Justice Utter’s Smith
concurrence was the sole opinion arguing for independent analysis of
article I, section 12.117 In the majority of cases during this period, the
Court refrained from independently analyzing article I, section 12
because the party failed to brief the Gunwall criteria or the Court
rejected that party’s Gunwall analysis.118 In 2002, Justice Utter’s
position finally became the majority position in Grant County Fire
Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake,119 where the Court
endorsed an independent analysis of article I, section 12.
IV. IN GRANT COUNTY I, THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME
COURT HELD THAT ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 REQUIRES AN
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS
In its 2002 decision in Grant County I, the Washington State Supreme
Court unanimously endorsed considering article I, section 12
114. Id. (reasoning that (1) the state action was lawful; (2) the right to a speedy trial is a
“privilege” under the state constitution; (3) the right is available to all juveniles; and (4) the class
distinction between juveniles tried in state versus juvenile court is constitutionally permissible).
115. Id. at 279, 281, 290–91, 814 P.2d at 659, 661, 666.
116. See infra Part V.
117. See Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 138 P.3d 963, 971 (2006) (observing that
“[u]ntil Grant County II no recent decision, and none applying Gunwall, had applied or described
circumstances under which a separate independent state analysis might apply under [article I,
section 12]”). Here, the Court appears to have forgotten Justice Utter’s Smith concurrence, although
it goes on to cite it several lines later. Id.
118. Compare 1519–1525 Lakeview Boulevard Condo. Ass’n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 144
Wash. 2d 570, 577, 29 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2001) (applying an equal protection analysis under the
Equal Protection Clause and article 1, section 12 where the petitioner did not argue for the court to
apply an independent state constitutional analysis), and Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 192,
822 P.2d 162, 175 (1991) (considering only the federal argument where appellant did not argue that
article I, section 12 should be “construed independently based upon the [Gunwall] factors”), with
Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 133 Wash. 2d 954, 979, 948 P.2d 1264, 1276 (1997)
(rejecting petitioners argument that article I, section 12 provided greater protection to corporate
insurers challenging a rule regarding attorneys fees, and thus refraining from engaging in an
independent analysis), and Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. of Wash., 116 Wash.
2d 352, 362, 804 P.2d 621, 626 (1991) (noting that article I, section 12 and the Fourteenth
Amendment “are substantially identical and have been so regarded by [the] court”).
119. Grant County I, 145 Wash. 2d 702, 42 P.3d 394 (2002), vacated in part, Grant County II,
150 Wash. 2d 791, 83 P.3d 419 (2004).
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independently of the Equal Protection Clause.120 The majority used the
Gunwall criteria to reach its position,121 while the dissent rejected
Gunwall and instead reached its conclusion through a plain-language
approach.122 The majority held that the right to petition was a privilege
and that the petition method of municipal annexation at issue violated
article I, section 12 because it granted some property owners a privilege
not afforded to others.123 On reconsideration in 2004 (Grant County
II124), the Court reaffirmed its belief that article I, section 12 required
consideration independent of the Equal Protection Clause, but vacated its
holding that the petition method of annexation violated the state
constitution.125 Grant County II’s holding regarding the relationship
between article I, section 12 and the Equal Protection Clause is
important not only because it is the first time a majority held that article
I, section 12 required independent consideration, but because the justices
have relied upon, and disagreed over, the meaning of Grant County II in
later decisions.126
A.

In Grant County II, the Majority Used the Gunwall Criteria to
Hold that Article I, Section 12 Requires a Constitutional Analysis
Independent from the Equal Protection Clause

Writing for the majority in Grant County II, Justice Bobbe Bridge
reaffirmed the Court’s holding in Grant County I that article I, section
12 “requires an independent constitutional analysis from the [Equal
Protection Clause].”127 To reach this determination, Justice Bridge
considered the six Gunwall criteria.128 In particular, Justice Bridge
explained that Oregon precedent, the original intent of the drafters of the

120. Id.
121. Id. at 731, 42 P.3d at 408.
122. Id. at 745–46, 42 P.3d at 415–16 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 735, 42 P.3d at 410.
124 150 Wash. 2d 791.
125. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d at 814, 83 P.3d at 429.
126. The Court’s holding with respect to the petition method of annexation is less important for
purposes of this Comment than its reasons for independently analyzing article I, section 12.
127. Grant County II, 150 Wash. at 805 n.10, 83 P.3d at 425 n.10. Justice Bridge noted:
Although the United States Constitution also has a privileges and immunities clause, federal
jurisprudence has focused on the federal equal protection clause in cases involving differential
treatment. Therefore, when determining whether the Washington privileges and immunities
clause provides more protection than the United States Constitution, this Court has always
compared it with the federal Equal Protection Clause rather than the federal Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Id.
128. Id. at 806–11, 83 P.3d at 425–28.
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Washington State Constitution, and early judicial interpretations of
article I, section 12 suggest the Court should independently analyze the
clause where the issue concerns favoritism.129 She also explained that
preexisting state law supports an independent analysis of article I,
section 12.130 Based on her Gunwall analysis, Justice Bridge concluded
“that article I, section 12 . . . requires an independent constitutional
analysis from the [Equal Protection Clause].”131 According to an
independent analysis under article I, section 12, Justice Bridge stated
that a law “must confer a privilege to a class of citizens” to violate the
provision.132 She concluded that the right to petition for annexation is
not a privilege under the clause.133
Justice Bridge’s majority opinion in Grant County II is subject to
multiple interpretations of when and how the Court should
independently analyze article I, section 12. Twice in the opinion, Justice
Bridge stated simply that article I, section 12 “requires an independent
constitutional analysis from the [Equal Protection Clause],”134 and in
later cases some justices have argued that the Grant County II court held
without qualification that article I, section 12 requires an independent
analysis.135 Alternatively, one might focus on Justice Bridge’s Gunwall
129. Id. at 807–09, 83 P.3d at 426–27. The provisions’ underlying concerns suggest that article I,
section 12 might be more protective of individual rights where a “small class is given a special
benefit, with the burden spread among the majority” while the Equal Protection Clause would be
more protective “where majority interests are advanced at the expense of minority interests.” Id. at
807, 83 P.3d at 426. Because the delegates modeled article I, section 12 on Oregon’s privileges and
immunities clause, the Oregon State Supreme Court’s independent interpretation of its provision is
persuasive in Washington. Id. at 807–08, 83 P.3d at 426. Early Washington State Supreme Court
decisions invalidated laws that unjustifiably favored one person or class at the expense of others.
Id.at 809 n.12, 83 P.3d at 427 n.12.
130. Id. at 811, 83 P.3d at 428. Prior to the state constitution’s adoption in 1889, the Organic Act
as revised prohibited the Territorial Legislature from granting special privileges. Id. at 810, 83 P.3d
at 427 (quoting Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 150, 14 Stat. 426 (as amended by Act of June 10, 1872,
ch. 1534, 17 Stat. 390); see also Hayes v. Territory of Wash., 2 Wash. Terr. 286, 288, 5 P. 927
(1884). In early cases after 1889, the Washington State Supreme Court “interpreted article I, section
12 independently from the federal provision and in a manner that focused on the award of special
privileges rather than the denial of equal protection.” Grant County II, 150 Wash. at 810, 83 P.3d at
427. In 1936, in Bacich, the Court “distinguished between the prohibition of ‘undue favor’ (drawn
from the state provision) and ‘hostile discrimination’ (drawn from the Fourteenth Amendment).” Id.
(quoting State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 80, 59 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1936), overruled on
other grounds by Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. Moos, 92 Wash. 2d 939, 603 P.2d 819 (1979)).
131. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d at 811, 83 P.3d at 428.
132. Id. at 812, 83 P.3d at 428.
133. Id. at 814, 83 P.3d at 429.
134. Id. at 805, 811, 83 P.3d at 425, 428.
135. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 122, 138 P.3d 963, 1040 (2006)
(Chambers, J., concurring in dissent) (asserting that the Court held that article I, section 12 protects
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analysis, and conclude that the Court held that article I, section 12
requires an independent analysis in the context of annexations (the
subject of the sixth Gunwall criterion).136 Justice Bridge’s Gunwall
analysis also discussed article I, section 12’s concern with favoritism
towards a class of citizens,137 and Chief Justice Madsen subsequently
focused on this part of the opinion to assert that Grant County II held
that article I, section 12 requires an independent analysis only where the
law exhibits favoritism towards a class of citizens.138 Indeed, in her
opinion, Justice Bridge stated that a law “must confer a privilege to a
class of citizens” to violate article I, section 12.139 Justice Bridge did not
specify, however, whether this is the only way a law may violate article
I, section 12.140 Accordingly, one can argue that Grant County II stands
for the proposition that a law conferring a privilege on an individual
citizen does not violate article I, section 12 because it does not implicate
a class of citizens.141 Justice Sanders faulted the majority on these
grounds.142
B.

In Grant County I and II, Justice Sanders Rejected the Assertion
that Article I, Section 12 Is Analogous to the Equal Protection
Clause

In his Grant County I dissent and Grant County II concurrence,
Justice Richard Sanders asked whether the right to petition for
annexation is a privilege and concluded that it is not.143 More
importantly, Justice Sanders disagreed with the majority’s assertion that
article I, section 12 is analogous to the Equal Protection Clause.144 In
the privileges and immunities of “all citizens” in Grant County II); see also Madison v. State, 161
Wash. 2d 85, 94 n.6, 163 P.3d 757, 764 n.6 (2007) (plurality opinion) (rejecting Justice Madsen’s
interpretation and asserting that the Court simply held that article I, section 12 requires an
independent analysis in Grant County II).
136. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d at 811, 83 P.3d at 428.
137. Id. at 806–07, 809, 83 P.3d at 425–27.
138. See Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 117, 163 P.3d at 773, 776 (Madsen, J., concurring);
Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 14, 138 P.3d at 971.
139. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d at 812, 83 P.3d at 428 (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Cf. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 14, 138 P.3d at 971 (plurality opinion) (maintaining that
Grant County II stands for the proposition that an independent analysis applies only where the law
grants a privilege or immunity to a minority class).
142. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d at 817–18, 83 P.3d at 431 (Sanders, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 820, 83 P.3d at 432; Grant County I, 145 Wash. 2d 702, 748, 42 P.3d 394, 417 (2002)
(Sanders, J., dissenting).
144. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d at 816–17, 83 P.3d at 430–31 (Sanders, J., concurring);
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Grant County I, Justice Sanders noted that the references in the
Fourteenth Amendment to privileges or immunities and equal protection
in “separate and distinct phrases . . . preclud[e] the inference that each
could possibly refer[s] to the same thing.”145 He went on to recognize
that the U.S. Supreme Court itself had distinguished the privileges and
immunities of federal citizenship from those of state citizenship.146
In his Grant County II concurrence, Justice Sanders asserted that the
“true comparison” is to the privileges and immunities clauses of Article
IV and the Fourteenth Amendment.147 Comparison to the Equal
Protection Clause, he asserted, is inconsistent with the majority’s
independent approach under article I, section 12 where it first determines
whether “the right in question is a ‘privilege’ or ‘immunity’ within the
scope of the clause and, if so, whether it has been denied.”148
Justice Sanders criticized the majority’s Gunwall analysis. He
asserted that it allowed the “analytic framework” of the Equal Protection
Clause to control “its review of [the] parties’ article I, section
12 . . . challenges.”149 Specifically, he observed that the majority’s “tilt”
toward the Equal Protection Clause also narrowed its interpretation of
article I, section 12, as evidenced by its frequent reference to “favoritism
of one ‘class’ over another.”150 “Although a privilege or immunity
violation may be class based,” he asserted, “the text of article I, section

Grant County I, 145 Wash. 2d at 745, 42 P.3d at 415 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
145. Grant County I, 145 Wash. 2d at 745, 42 P.3d at 415 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 746, 42 P.3d at 416 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77
(1872)). Justice Sanders briefly traced the history of “privileges and immunities” from pre-colonial
England to American independence, finally noting that the terms appeared in the Articles of
Confederation and in Article IV of the federal Constitution. Id. at 746–47, 42 P.3d at 416.
147. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d at 817, 83 P.3d at 431 (Sanders, J., concurring).
148. Id. (citing State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 288, 814 P.2d 652, 664 (1991) (Utter, J.,
concurring). Justice Sanders also criticized the majority’s reliance on the Slaughter-House Cases,
arguing that the case is less relevant for its treatment of the Equal Protection Clause than for its
treatment of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “which limits those
privileges and immunities to those secured by national, as opposed to state, citizenship.” Id. at 818,
83 P.3d at 431.
149. Id. at 817, 83 P.3d at 431 (citing id. at 805–08, 83 P.3d at 425–426 (majority opinion)).
150. Id. (citing id. at 807, 812, 83 P.3d at 426, 428). Justice Sanders’ contention does not
acknowledge or admit that the majority also referenced article I, section 12’s application to
individual persons. See, e.g., id. at 808, 83 P.3d at 426 (noting that Oregon holds that its privileges
and immunities clause is “triggered whenever a person is denied a privilege” (emphasis added)); id.
at 809 n.12, 83 P.3d at 427 n.12 (noting that under early case law, Washington upheld a law if it
“did not favor a particular person or class” (emphasis added)); id. at 810, 83 P.3d at 427–28
(quoting State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 80, 59 P.2d 1101 (1936), for the proposition
that the purpose of article I, section 12 is to secure equal treatment for all persons).
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12 also protects ‘any citizen’ as well as ‘class of citizens.’”151
In sum, Grant County II opened several doors to approaching article
I, section 12 independently. One can argue that the Court held that
article I, section 12 requires an independent analysis in all cases, that
article I, section 12 requires an independent analysis in the case of
annexations, or where the law exhibits favoritism towards a minority
class.152 But Grant County II arguably shut one door opened by Justice
Utter’s concurrence in State v. Smith. For while the Grant County II
majority opinion cited to Justice Utter’s Gunwall analysis in his Smith
concurrence, it did not follow him in adopting Oregon’s approach to
state privileges and immunities.153 The Court did not explicitly reject
Oregon’s approach, but its silence appears to have served as an implicit
rejection. That reading finds further support in later decisions, such as
Andersen v. King County154 and Madison v. State,155 where the
Washington State Supreme Court split further on when and how to
independently analyze article I, section 12.156 In Andersen and Madison,
the justices offered three visions of when and how the Court should
independently analyze article I, section 12, none of which aligns with
Oregon’s approach to its own privileges and immunities clause.157
V.

IN ANDERSEN AND MADISON, THE WASHINGTON STATE
SUPREME COURT DIVIDED ON WHEN AND HOW TO
INDEPENDENTLY ANALYZE ARTICLE I, SECTION 12

Two cases since Grant County II suggest that the Washington State
Supreme Court has divided into three camps as to when and how to
independently analyze article I, section 12.158 In 2006 in Andersen v.
King County, the Court considered whether the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) violates article I, section 12.159 In 2007 in Madison v. State, the
Court considered whether the State’s disenfranchisement scheme, which

151. Id. at 817, 83 P.3d at 431.
152. See supra Part IV.A.
153. See supra Part III.B.
154. 158 Wash. 2d 1, 138 P.3d. 963 (2006).
155. 161 Wash. 2d 85, 163 P. 3d 757 (2007).
156. See infra Part V.
157. See infra Part V.
158. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 163 P.3d 757; Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 138 P.3d 963. For
purposes of this Comment, the Court’s holdings in Andersen and Madison with respect to DOMA
and disenfranchisement are less important than its approach to article I, section 12.
159. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 138 P.3d. 963.
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denies felons the right to vote, violates article I, section 12.160 In those
cases, Justice Johnson—with the support of Justices Tom Chambers,
Susan Owens (in Andersen), and Sanders—argued the Court should
independently analyze article I, section 12 in every case according to its
plain language.161 By contrast, Justice Madsen,162 with the support of
Chief Justice Gerry Alexander and Justice Charles Johnson, argued the
Court should independently analyze article I, section 12 only when the
challenged law grants a privilege or immunity to a minority class.163
Finally, Justice Fairhurst, with the support of Justices Bridge and Owens
(in Madison), argued the Court should independently analyze article I,
section 12 only when the state constitution is more protective of the right
at issue than the Equal Protection Clause.164
A.

Justice Johnson Argues That the Court Should Independently
Analyze Article I, Section 12 in Every Instance

In Andersen and Madison, Justice Johnson rejected the assertion that
article I, section 12 is analogous to the Equal Protection Clause.165
Justice Johnson also refrained from performing a Gunwall analysis.166
Instead, Justice Johnson argued the Court should independently analyze

160. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 163 P. 3d 757.
161. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 119, 163 P.3d at 757 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 127–28,
163 P.3d at 781–82 (Chambers, J., concurring in dissent); Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 58–59, 138
P.3d at 993 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring); Anderson, 158 Wash.2d at 123 n.91, 138 P.3d at 1041
n.3 (Chambers, J., concurring in dissent).
162. Justice Madsen became the sitting Chief Justice of the Washington State Supreme Court
upon Chief Justice Alexander’s retirement in 2009. Biography of Chief Justice Barbara Madsen,
WASH. COURTS,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/supreme/bios/?fa=scbios.display_file&fileID=mad
sen (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). Subsequent references to Chief Justice Madsen in the context of her
opinions in Madison and Anderson use her title at the time the opinions were written.
163. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 163 P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring); Andersen, 158
Wash. 2d at 16, 53, 138 P.3d at 972, 990 (plurality opinion).
164. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 93–97, 111, 163 P.3d at 764–66, 773 (majority opinion).
165. See Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 62, 138 P.3d at 995 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring) (“[T]he
most apt analogy from the United States Constitution is its privileges and immunities clause, not the
equal protection clause.”); see also id. at 124, 138 P.3d at 1041–42 (Chambers, J., concurring in
dissent) (arguing that there are important analytic differences between article I, section 12 and the
Equal Protection Clause).
166. See id. at 58, 138 P.3d at 993 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring) (stating that a constitutional
analysis should begin, and generally end, with the text). But see Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 118, 163
P.3d at 776 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring) (noting that Grant County II held that article I, section 12
requires an independent analysis, but then arguing that an “independent examination of article I,
section 12 should be conducted in accordance with its plain language”).
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article I, section 12 in all cases.167 The plain language of article I, section
12, Justice Johnson argued, requires a two-part analysis: (1) Does the
law grant a citizen, class of citizens, or corporation privileges or
immunities; and, if yes, (2) are those privileges or immunities equally
available to all?168 If the answer to both questions is yes, then the law
does not violate article I, section 12. In no case, Justice Johnson asserted,
should the Court review the claim under an Equal Protection analysis.169
In his Andersen concurrence, Justice Johnson applied the two-part
analysis to the challenge that DOMA “confers the ‘privilege’ of
marriage to opposite-sex couples while withholding it to same-sex
couples.”170 Asking whether “same-sex marriage” is a privilege under
the state constitution, Justice Johnson concluded that it is not, and
dismissed the article I, section 12 claim rather than review it under an
Equal Protection Clause analysis.171 Justice Johnson’s approach is
consistent with Justice Sanders’ minority approach in Grant County II
and with an interpretation that the majority opinion in Grant County II
held that article I, section 12 requires an independent analysis in all
cases.
B.

Chief Justice Madsen Argues the Court Should Independently
Analyze Article I, Section 12 Only Where the Challenged Law
Grants a Privilege or Immunity to a Minority Class

In Andersen and Madison, Justice Madsen presumed that article I,
section 12 is analogous to the Equal Protection Clause and relied on the
Gunwall criteria to determine when the Court should analyze article I,
section 12 independently of the Clause.172 She argued that the Court
167. See Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 118–22, 163 P.3d at 777–78 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring)
(independently analyzing article I, section 12); Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 58–64, 138 P.3d 993–96
(J.M. Johnson, J., concurring) (independently analyzing article I, section 12).
168. See Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 119, 163 P.3d at 777 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring);
Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 58–59, 138 P.3d at 993–94 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 121,
123 & n.91, 138 P.3d at 1040–41, 1041 n.3 (Chambers, J., concurring in dissent) (concluding that
“properly read, article I, section 12 of the Washington constitution protects us against all
governmental actions that create unmerited favoritism in granting fundamental personal rights”).
Justice Johnson additionally argued that early cases also require the court to first ask whether the
right at issue is a privilege or immunity. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 61–62, 138 P.3d at 963. He
noted that if there is not a privilege or immunity at issue, then there is not a violation of article I,
section 12. Id.
169. Cf. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 59–65, 138 P.3d at 993–96 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring); id.
at 121, 123, 138 P.3d at 1040–41 (Chambers, J., concurring in dissent).
170. Id. at 62, 138 P.3d at 995 (J.M. Johnson, J., concurring).
171. Id.
172. See id. at 14, 138 P.3d at 971 (plurality opinion) (noting that in Grant County II, the Court
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should independently analyze article I, section 12 “only where the
challenged legislation grants a privilege or immunity to a minority
class.”173 “In other cases,” Justice Madsen argued, article I, section 12
requires “the same analysis that appl[ies] under the federal [Equal
Protection Clause].” 174
Justice Madsen’s approach to article I, section 12 is based on her
reading of Grant County II as concluding that the Court should
independently analyze the provision only where its underlying concern
with undue favoritism is at issue.175 In Justice Madsen’s view, under
article I, section 12 favoritism is an issue only “where a privilege or
immunity is granted to a minority class.”176 In other words, under Justice
Madsen’s reading, Grant County II did not hold that an independent
analysis is always appropriate under article I, section 12.177
Justice Madsen’s plurality opinion in Andersen illustrates her
approach to article I, section 12. In Andersen, Justice Madsen found that
DOMA did not grant a privilege or immunity to a minority class.178
“[T]he article I, section 12 issue,” Justice Madsen argued, “is whether
plaintiffs are discriminated against as members of a minority class.”179
“Accordingly,” Justice Madsen “appl[ied] the same constitutional
analysis that applies under the equal protection clause.”180 After finding
that homosexuals are not a suspect class and the right to same-sex
marriage is not fundamental, Justice Madsen applied rational basis
review.181 Justice Madsen concluded that “limiting marriage to oppositesex couples furthers the State’s interests in procreation and encouraging
families with a mother and father and children biologically related to

determined when article I, section 12 requires an analysis independent of the Equal Protection
Clause); see also Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 163 P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring) (relying
on Grant County II for the proposition that article I, section 12 requires an analysis independent of
the Equal Protection Clause).
173. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 163 P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring); Andersen, 158
Wash. 2d at 14, 138 P.3d at 971 (emphasis added).
174. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111–12, 163 P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring); Andersen, 158
Wash. 2d at 14, 16, 138 P.3d at 971–72.
175. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 14–16, 138 P.3d at 971–72.
176. Id. at 16, 138 P.3d at 972 (referring to minority class as “a few” and, therefore, referring to
minority in the quantitative rather than qualitative sense).
177. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 111, 163 P.3d at 773 (Madsen, J., concurring).
178. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 18, 138 P.3d at 973.
179. Id. at 18, 138 P.3d at 973.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 21, 30–31, 138 P.3d at 974–75, 979–80.
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both.”182 Finding this to be a rational basis for the law’s distinction
between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to marriage,
Justice Madsen determined that DOMA does not violate article I, section
12.183
C.

Justice Fairhurst Argues the Court Should Independently Analyze
Article I, Section 12 Only Where the State Constitution Is More
Protective of the Right at Issue than the United States Constitution

In Madison, Justice Fairhurst presumed that article I, section 12 is
analogous to the Equal Protection Clause, and relied on the Gunwall
criteria to determine when the Court should analyze article I, section 12
independently of the Clause.184 Justice Fairhurst argued that article I,
section 12 requires an independent analysis only where the state
constitution provides greater protection for the right at issue than the
U.S. Constitution.185
Justice Fairhurst advocates for a two-step inquiry to determine
whether the state constitution is more protective of the right at issue than
the U.S. Constitution.186 With respect to article I, section 12, Justice
Fairhurst actually engages in a three-step inquiry, where she asks (1)
whether the Gunwall criteria support analyzing article I, section 12
independent of the Equal Protection Clause, (2) whether the challenged
law implicates a privilege or immunity, and (3) whether the state
constitution provides greater protection to the right at issue than the
Equal Protection Clause.187 If the state constitution does not provide
greater protection to the right at issue than the Equal Protection Clause,
Justice Fairhurst does not proceed to apply the tiered scrutiny of Equal
Protection to article I, section 12.188
182. Id. at 42, 138 P.3d at 985.
183. Id.
184. Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 93–95, 163 P.3d 757, 764–65 (2007) (plurality opinion).
185. Id. at 94, 163 P.3d at 764.
186. Id. at 93, 163 P.3d at 764. Justice Fairhurst states that the Court first considers the Gunwall
criteria to determine whether the state constitutional provision requires an analysis independent of
the federal Constitution, and second whether the provision is more protective of the right at issue
that the federal Constitution.
187. Id. at 93–95, 163 P.3d at 764–65.
188. Cf. id. at 97–98, 163 P.3d at 766 (dismissing the respondents’ article I, section 12 claim
where the state constitution was not more protective than the federal Constitution with respect to
felons’ right to vote). Note that in Madison, Justice Fairhurst also found that the respondents failed
to assert an article I, section 12 claim. Id. Thus, her Madison opinion does not provide a clear
indication that she would not apply an Equal Protection analysis to article I, section 12 where the
state constitution is not more protective than the U.S. Constitution.
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In Madison, Justice Fairhurst noted that the Court determined in
Grant County II that article I, section 12 requires an independent
analysis and that repeated Gunwall analyses are unnecessary.189 Thus,
Madison suggests that Justice Fairhurst’s first prong is not, or is no
longer, an inquiry at all. Justice Fairhurst next asked whether the right to
vote—the right at issue in Madison—was a privilege or immunity.190
Relying on state precedent and article I, section 19, which “prohibits
interference with ‘the free exercise of the right of suffrage,’” she held
that the right to vote is a privilege.191
“Having determined that [article I, section 12] warrants an
independent state constitutional analysis and that the right to vote is a
privilege,” Justice Fairhurst next asked “whether and to what extent the
clause provides greater protection in the context of felon voting.”192 To
make the determination, Justice Fairhurst employed the Gunwall criteria
selectively.193 Invoking the fourth Gunwall criterion, Justice Fairhurst
reviewed preexisting state law.194 She noted that while the Court had
previously held that the state constitution provides greater protection for
the right to vote than the federal Constitution, the Court had not done so
with respect to felons’ right to vote.195 In conclusion, Justice Fairhurst
held that the state constitution “is not more protective of the right to vote
in this context,” and declined to independently analyze article I, section
12.196
In sum, Chief Justice Madsen and Justices Johnson and Fairhurst
offer three approaches to independently analyzing article I, section 12.
Justice Johnson’s approach rejects the assertion that article I, section 12
is analogous to the Equal Protection Clause and permits the Court to
independently analyze article I, section 12 in every case. Justices
Madsen and Fairhurst assert that article I, section 12 is analogous to the
Equal Protection Clause. Chief Justice Madsen’s approach permits the
Court to independently analyze article I, section 12 only where the
challenged law grants a privilege or immunity to a minority class. In all
189. Id. at 94–95, 163 P.3d at 764–65.
190. Id. at 95, 163 P.3d at 765.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 96, 163 P.3d at 765.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 96, 163 P.3d at 765–66.
196. Id. at 96–98, 163 P.3d at 766 (noting, however, that the respondents also “failed to assert an
article I, section 12 violation” because the state’s “disenfranchisement scheme does not involve a
grant of favoritism”).
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other cases, Chief Justice Madsen’s approach directs the Court to apply
the tiered scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause under article I, section
12. Justice Fairhurst’s approach effectively permits the Court to
independently analyze article I, section 12 only when the state
constitution provides greater protection to the right at issue than the
federal Constitution. Because the Court is split three ways on how best
to address article I, section 12, it is worthwhile to weigh the merits of the
three current approaches.
VI. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT JUSTICE JOHNSON’S
APPROACH, WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ORIGINAL
INTENT, PLAIN LANGUAGE, AND EARLY DECISIONS
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 12
Justice Johnson’s approach to article I, section 12 is sounder than the
approaches advanced by his fellow justices. Chief Justice Madsen’s and
Justice Fairhurst’s approaches both rely on the Gunwall criteria to
determine when the Court should independently analyze article I, section
12 and are therefore susceptible to much of the criticism that has been
lodged against Gunwall itself. Their approaches also perpetuate the
dependency of state constitutional analysis on the federal Constitution
and thereby sacrifice judicial economy, finality, and the dignity of
Washington courts and the state constitution. Moreover, Chief Justice
Madsen’s approach is inconsistent with the text, original intent, and
early judicial interpretations of article I, section 12. And Justice
Fairhurst’s approach is internally inconsistent in its treatment of the
Equal Protection Clause. Justice Johnson’s approach avoids these pitfalls
and offers a straightforward approach to article I, section 12 that
accounts for its original intent and plain language and early precedent
interpreting it.
A.

Chief Justice Madsen’s and Justice Fairhurst’s Approaches Do
Not Address the Deficiencies of Gunwall and Undermine Judicial
Economy, Finality, and the Dignity of Washington Courts and the
State Constitution

The approaches to article I, section 12 advanced by Chief Justice
Madsen and Justice Fairhurst are subject to some of the same criticism.
Both approaches rely on the Gunwall criteria, and are therefore
vulnerable to the same criticism that has been lodged against the
Gunwall criteria themselves. Also, both approaches perpetuate the
dependency of state constitutional analysis on the U.S. Constitution. In
doing so, they sacrifice judicial economy, finality, and the dignity of

17 - WLR March 2012 Zellers Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

360

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

3/15/2012 12:08 PM

[Vol. 87:331

Washington courts and the state constitution.
The Gunwall criteria offer a distorted comparative analysis of the
Washington State Constitution and U.S. Constitution.197 They suggest
that the Court compare only the text and structure of the state and federal
constitutions, but not relevant intent, precedent, and values.198 Instead,
Gunwall suggests that the Court consider only the original intent,
precedent, and values associated with the state constitutional
provision.199 The result is an incomplete and imbalanced comparative
analysis of the state and federal constitutions.200
The Gunwall criteria are more problematic in the case of article I,
section 12 because the clause parallels three federal provisions: the
Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, and the Privileges or Immunitites Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Yet, the Court’s Gunwall analyses of article I, section 12
have only compared it to the Equal Protection Clause. In Grant County
II, Justice Bridge incorrectly reasoned that the Court has always
compared article I, section 12 to the Equal Protection Clause because
“federal jurisprudence has focused on the [Clause] in cases involving
differential treatment.”201 The Court has not always compared article I,
section 12 to the Equal Protection Clause; in earlier cases, it also
compared article I, section 12 to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV.202 Furthermore, federal jurisprudence has not focused solely
on the Equal Protection Clause to address differential treatment. The
U.S. Supreme Court has also focused on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV to address state and local differentiation between
state citizens and out-of-state citizens.203 The U.S. Supreme Court
interprets and analyzes the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV and the Equal Protection Clause differently.204 Grant County II’s
Gunwall analysis, upon which both Chief Justice Madsen’s and Justice
Fairhurst’s approaches rely, fails to consider similarities and differences

197. James W. Talbot, Comment, Rethinking Civil Liberties Under the Washington State
Constitution, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1099, 1108 (1991).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d 791, 805 n.10, 83 P.3d 419, 425 n.10 (2004).
202. See, e.g., State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458, 70 P. 34, 41 (1902).
203. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV protects a narrower set of rights than the Equal Protection Clause, and the U.S. Supreme Court
applies intermediate scrutiny rather than tiered scrutiny under it.
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between article I, section 12 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV. For that reason, they also fail to account for the U.S.
Supreme Court’s different treatment of Article IV and the Fourteenth
Amendment.205 In Grant County II, Justice Sanders criticized the
majority’s Gunwall analysis for this reason.206 Because the approaches
advanced by Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Fairhurst build on the
deficiencies in Grant County II’s Gunwall analysis, the Court should not
adopt their approaches to article I, section 12.
The approaches advanced by Chief Justice Madsen and Justice
Fairhurst are also objectionable because they both make state
constitutional analysis dependent on federal constitutional analysis.207 In
State v. Gocken,208 Justice Madsen warned the Court against hitching
state constitutional analysis to the federal Constitution. Specifically, she
argued that reliance on federal precedent to interpret the state
constitution would sacrifice judicial efficiency because a shift at the
federal level could force the Court to revisit issues that it might
otherwise leave undisturbed.209 Finality, she argued, would also be
sacrificed “because state decisions tied to federal law may be open to
reversal by the [U.S.] Supreme Court.”210 Moreover, she argued,
hitching state constitutional analysis to federal precedent diminishes the
Court and the state constitution.211 For the reasons Chief Justice Madsen
laid out in Gocken, the Washington State Supreme Court should not

205. Cf. Grant County I, 145 Wash. 2d 702, 745, 42 P.3d 394, 415–16 (2002) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s failure to account for the U.S. Supreme Court’s different
treatment of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause).
206. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d at 817, 83 P.3d at 431 (Sanders, J., concurring). Justice
Sanders argued that the majority erred by allowing the “analytic framework” of the Equal Protection
Clause to “hold sway over its review of [the] parties’ article I, section 12 . . . challenges.” Id.
207. The reader will recall that Chief Justice Madsen would perpetuate article I, section 12’s
dependence on the Equal Protection Clause by continuing to apply its tiered scrutiny to article I,
section 12 whenever the challenged law does not grant a privilege or immunity to a minority class.
Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 111, 163 P.3d 757, 773 (2007) (Madsen, J., concurring);
Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 138 P.3d 963, 971 (2006). Justice Fairhurst would
perpetuate article I, section 12’s dependence on the Equal Protection Clause by independently
analyzing claims under it only where the federal Constitution provides less protection than the state
constitution. Madison, 161 Wash. 2d at 93–95, 163 P.3d at 764–66.
208. 127 Wash. 2d 95, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995).
209. Id. at 110–11, 896 P.2d at 1274–75 (Madsen, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 111, 896 P.2d at 1274.
211. See id. at 111, 896 P.2d at 1274–75 (“[I]ndependent state constitutional analysis [gets] lost
somewhere in the ever-shifting shadow of the federal courts which are no less political and perhaps
more so than . . . state courts.”).
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adopt her or Justice Fairhurst’s approach to article I, section 12.212
B.

Chief Justice Madsen’s Argument that Article I, Section 12 Applies
Independently Only Where a Law Grants a Privilege or Immunity
to a Minority Class Is Inconsistent with the Provision’s Text,
Original Intent, and Early Precedent

Chief Justice Madsen’s approach is inconsistent with the text of
article I, section 12. Despite the fact that article I, section 12 prohibits
laws that grant privileges or immunities unequally “to any citizen, class
of citizens, or corporation,” Chief Justice Madsen’s approach limits
independent analysis under the provision to laws which grant a privilege
or immunity to a minority class.213 To the extent that Justice Madsen’s
approach reinterprets article I, section 12 as inapplicable to grants to
individual citizens or treats majority and minority classes differently in
terms of available protections, it is inconsistent with the provision’s text.
Chief Justice Madsen’s departure from the text of article I, section 12
is inconsistent with her reliance on the text to argue against
independently analyzing the provision. In Andersen, Justice Madsen
argued that the text and history of article I, section 12 justify not
following the Oregon State Supreme Court’s practice of independently
analyzing article I, section 12.214 She asserted that inclusion of the word
“corporations” in article I, section 12 creates a difference in language,
which shows the delegates’ concern with the outsized political influence
of wealthy interests.215 Yet, by the same reasoning, the delegates’
retention of the words “any citizen” from Oregon’s provision suggests
the delegates were also concerned about the influence of individual
citizens. Chief Justice Madsen did not make this further point in
Andersen, and it is inconsistent with her assertion that the underlying
212. For a similar argument, see generally Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a
Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491 (1984). Justice Utter argued that deciding cases on independent state
constitutional grounds is “consistent not only with the dignity and independence of [Washington
State] courts and [its] constitution, but also with the oft-stated ‘fundamental principle’ that [state]
courts should not rule on constitutional issues when a case can be resolved on lesser grounds.” Id. at
505. The purpose of the rule is to protect what Justice Madsen found compelling in Gocken. From
Justice Utter: “[J]udicial economy, respect for the authority of lower law, and a concern for the
propriety of unnecessary judicial application of the highest law to invalidate lower laws or
governmental actions.” Id.
213. Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 111, 163 P.3d 757, 773 (2007) (Madsen, J., concurring)
(emphasis added); Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 13–14, 138 P.3d 963, 971 (2006).
214. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 16, 138 P.3d at 972.
215. Id. at 15, 138 P.3d at 972.
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concern of article I, section 12 is only grants of favoritism to minority
classes. Furthermore, the addition of “corporations” to Oregon’s
provision suggests continuity, not difference, in light of the fact that
Oregon’s provision is still contained within article I, section 12. It also
suggests that article I, section 12 is broader than the Oregon provision,
not narrower as Chief Justice Madsen’s reading suggests.
Chief Justice Madsen’s position that article I, section 12 applies
independently only where the challenged law implicates a minority class
is also inconsistent with early precedent interpreting the provision. In
City of Seattle v. Rogers,216 the Washington State Supreme Court struck
down a law that exempted “the annual campaign of the Seattle
Community Fund” from a prohibition on certain charity campaigns
because it violated article I, section 12.217 Rogers stands for the
proposition that article I, section 12 does not apply only to classes.
Similarly, in Altschul v. State,218 the Oregon State Supreme Court struck
down a law granting an individual citizen the right to sue the state
because it violated Oregon’s privileges and immunities clause.219
Altschul is persuasive authority that article I, section 12 applies to
individual citizens. Finally, in Fitch v. Applegate,220 Justice Dunbar
stated that a law’s “constitutionality is not affected by the number of
persons within the scope of its operation” for article I, section 12
purposes.221 As Rogers, Altschul, and Fitch suggest, early interpretations
of article I, section 12 were broader than Chief Justice Madsen’s.
Chief Justice Madsen has suggested that her approach is based on
article I, section 12’s underlying concern with favoritism toward
minority classes. However, the provision’s text, original intent, and early
precedent suggest that Chief Justice Madsen’s interpretation is
unjustifiably narrow. Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court should
not adopt Chief Justice Madsen’s approach to article I, section 12.

216. 6 Wash. 2d 31, 106 P.2d 598 (1940).
217. Id. at 36–38, 106 P.2d at 600–01.
218. 144 P. 124 (1914).
219. Id. at 125–26. The Oregon State Supreme Court maintains that its privileges and immunities
clause applies to individual citizens. State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810, 814–15 (Or. 1981).
220. 24 Wash. 25, 64 P. 147 (1901).
221. Id. at 31, 64 P. at 148. Justice Dunbar was a delegate to the state constitutional convention.
JOURNAL, supra note 21, at 470; Justice Ralph O. Dunbar, supra note 66.
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Justice Fairhurst’s Approach to Article I, Section 12 Is Internally
Inconsistent Because It Presumes that the Provision Is Analogous
to the Equal Protection Clause

Justice Fairhurst’s decision not to apply an Equal Protection Clause
analysis to claims that fail to trigger an independent analysis under
article I, section 12 creates internal inconsistency. Justice Fairhurst’s
approach to article I, section 12 presumes that the provision is analogous
to the Equal Protection Clause.222 Like Chief Justice Madsen, Justice
Fairhurst relies on the Gunwall criteria to first determine whether the
Court should analyze article I, section 12 independently of the Equal
Protection Clause in a particular case. 223 Yet, unlike Chief Justice
Madsen, Justice Fairhurst does not go on to examine a claimed violation
of article I, section 12 under an Equal Protection Clause analysis if she
determines that a party’s claim does not trigger an independent analysis
under article I, section 12.224 This approach is inconsistent with the
presumption that article I, section 12 is analogous to the Equal
Protection Clause and should therefore be rejected by the Court.
D.

Justice Johnson’s Approach Preserves Judicial Economy, Finality,
and the Dignity of Washington Courts and the State Constitution,
and Is Consistent with the Original Intent, Plain Language, and
Early Decisions Under Article I, Section 12

Justice Johnson’s approach to article I, section 12 avoids the pitfalls
of the approaches advanced by Chief Justice Madsen and Justice
Fairhurst. His approach does not rely on the Gunwall criteria and does
not make article I, section 12 dependent on the U.S. Constitution. And
unlike Chief Justice Madsen’s approach, his approach is consistent with
the original intent, plain language, and early judicial interpretations of
article I, section 12.
The original intent of article I, section 12 is distinct from that of the
Equal Protection Clause. Article I, section 12’s original purpose was “to
prevent people from seeking certain privileges or benefits to the
disadvantage of others.”225 That purpose “clearly differs from the main
goal of the equal protection clause, which was primarily concerned with

222. Madison v. State, 161 Wash. 2d 85, 93–95, 163 P.3d 757, 764–65 (2007).
223. Id. at 93–95, 163 P.3d at 764–65.
224. See id. at 98, 163 P.3d at 766.
225. State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 283, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring).
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preventing discrimination against former slaves,” a minority group.226
The creation of article I, section 12 supports the conclusion that the
delegates intended something different than the Equal Protection Clause.
The delegates who drafted article I referred to the constitutions of
Oregon, Indiana, California, Alabama, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, New
Hampshire, and the United States.227 Yet the Committee hewed closest
to the state constitutions, especially Oregon’s, and only selectively to the
federal Constitution.228 The choice to follow state constitutions rather
than the federal Constitution in letter and spirit suggests that the
delegates sought to adopt individual rights that were substantively
similar to those in other state constitutions rather than those guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution.229 This choice is especially clear with respect
to article I, section 12, where the committee appropriated language from
the Oregon State Constitution rather than from the federal Constitution
and broadened the prohibition on privileges and immunities to apply to
corporations.230 Justice Johnson’s approach to article I, section 12 is
consistent with the delegates’ intent because, unlike Chief Justice
Madsen and Justice Fairhurst’s approaches, he does not presume that
article I, section 12 is analogous to the Equal Protection Clause. Because
Justice Johnson’s approach is most consistent with the original intent of
article I, section 12, the Washington State Supreme Court should adopt
it.
The plain language of article I, section 12 is significantly different
from that of the Equal Protection Clause.231 The plain language of article
I, section 12 suggests a two-part analysis for reviewing challenged
legislation, which asks (1) whether the challenged law grants a privilege
or immunity to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than
municipal, and (2) whether the grant applies to all citizens or
corporations equally. 232 As the plain language of article I, section 12
and the Equal Protection Clause suggest, both clauses “seek to prevent
the State from distributing benefits and burdens unequally.”233 The plain
language of the provisions also shows that the Equal Protection Clause
226. Grant County II, 150 Wash. 2d 791, 808, 83 P.3d 419, 426 (2004).
227. BEARDSLEY, supra note 21.
228. Id.
229. See supra Part I.A.
230. See supra Part I.B.
231. State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 285, 814 P.2d 652, 662 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring).
232. Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 58–59, 138 P.3d 963, 993 (2006) (J.M. Johnson,
J., concurring).
233. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d at 283, 814 P.2d at 661 (Utter, J., concurring).
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applies to any right, while article I, section 12 only applies to a privilege
or immunity.234 In this respect, article I, section 12 has more in common
with the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV than the Equal
Protection Clause.235 Of the three approaches, Justice Johnson’s
approach incorporates the plain language of article I, section 12 and best
recognizes its differences from the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Johnson’s approach applies the plain language of article I, section 12 to
every claim brought under the provision, and rejects the presumption
that article I, section 12 is analogous to or coterminous with the Equal
Protection Clause. Because his approach is most consistent with the
provision’s plain language, the Court should adopt it.
In early cases, the Court analyzed claims under article I, section 12
independently of the Equal Protection Clause. In State v. Carey,236 for
example, the Court reviewed claimed violations of article I, section 12,
Article IV, and the Fourteenth Amendment in independent analyses.237
Similarly, in Henry v. Thurston County238 and State ex rel. Lindsey v.
Derbyshire,239 the Court reviewed claimed violations of article I, section
12 and the Fourteenth Amendment in independent analyses.240 In a series
of other cases, the Court interpreted claims under article I, section 12
without resort or reference to the Equal Protection Clause.241 And in
State v. Vance, the Court held that article I, section 12 should be defined
and interpreted as the U.S. Supreme Court had defined and interpreted

234. Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 124, 138 P.3d at 1042 (Chambers, J., concurring in dissent)
(quoting Smith, 117 Wash. 2d at 283, 814. P.2d at 652 (Utter J., concurring)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
235. State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458, 70 P. 34, 41 (1902).
236. 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729 (1892).
237. Id. at 426–28, 30 P. 729–30.
238. 31 Wash. 638, 72 P. 488 (1903).
239. 79 Wash. 227, 140 P. 540 (1914).
240. Id. at 231, 234, 237, 140 P. 542–44; Henry, 31 Wash. at 641–42, 72 P. at 489.
241. See, e.g., State v. Robinson Co., 84 Wash. 246, 250, 146 P. 628, 629 (1915) (holding that
state law that exempted cereal and flour mills from its provisions and authorized them to sell mixed
feeding stuffs while placing conditions on other persons, companies, corporations, or agents selling
the same thing violated article I, section 12); City of Seattle v. Dencker, 58 Wash. 501, 510–11, 108
P. 1086, 1090 (1910) (holding a Seattle ordinance unconstitutional under article I, section 12 where
it imposed a tax on the sale of certain goods by machine but not on merchants selling the same
goods); City of Spokane v. Macho, 51 Wash. 322, 323–26, 98 P. 755, 755–56 (1909) (holding that a
Spokane ordinance regulating employment agencies was unconstitutional because it imposed
criminal penalties on such entities engaging in false pretenses but not on other companies engaging
in similar conduct); Ex parte Camp, 38 Wash. 393, 397–98, 80 P. 547, 549 (1905) (holding that a
Spokane ordinance prohibiting anyone from peddling fruits and vegetables within city limit but
exempting farmers who grew the produce themselves violated article I, section 12).
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the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.242 By contrast, the
Court’s treatment of article I, section 12 as analogous to the Equal
Protection Clause did not begin until the 1920s, and became its general
approach only in the 1940s, fifty years after the creation of the state
constitution.243 As the only approach that rejects the presumption that
article I, section 12 is analogous to the Equal Protection Clause, Justice
Johnson’s approach to article I, section 12 is most consistent with this
early precedent.
CONCLUSION
The Washington State Supreme Court has applied the federal tiered
scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause to article I, section 12 from the
1940s through the present day. But, since the mid-1980s, the Court has
been questioning this practice. Recently, the Court has divided on when
and how to independently analyze article I, section 12. Chief Justice
Madsen and Justices Fairhurst and Johnson have put forth three different
approaches to independently analyzing article I, section 12. The Court
should adopt Justice Johnson’s approach. Unlike Chief Justice Madsen’s
and Justice Fairhurst’s approaches, it does not sacrifice judicial
efficiency, finality, and the dignity and independence of Washington
courts and the state constitution. Perhaps most importantly, it is
consistent with the original intent, plain language, and early decisions
interpreting article I, section 12.

242. State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458, 70 P. 34, 41 (1902).
243. See supra Part II.B.

